Writing in Perspectivas: Journal of Political Science, Tlhokomelo Rethabile Monethi, in “The feasibility study: Is Africa ready to join the blockchain revolution?” locates the core constraint on blockchain-based financial adoption in Africa not in technology but in political economy. Drawing on development economics, governance literature, regulatory analysis, and empirical reporting, the study demonstrates that African governments recognize blockchain’s potential but remain selective in its adoption, particularly where decentralized systems would “facilitate a shift of power from government back to the people.
The paper examines blockchain-based financial tools specifically: central bank digital currencies (CBDC), digital payments infrastructure, and cryptocurrency exchanges. It finds that political interest in these technologies has not produced systems that reduce state intermediation. Instead, governments have pursued tightly managed instruments such as regulatory sandboxes and CBDCs that preserve institutional control.
On the regulatory side, Monethi observes that governments do not regulate blockchain itself but instead the products built on top of it, because existing legal frameworks were not designed for decentralized systems. Regulatory sandboxes, therefore, emerge as a safe compromise. They let regulators watch innovation without changing the rules too much. This approach signals institutional caution rather than real readiness.
CBDCs represent a more assertive, yet equally constrained, response. The paper’s treatment of Nigeria’s eNaira and Ghana’s e-Zwich biometric payment systems illustrates how state-led digital money is positioned as a solution to inefficiency, exclusion, and institutional distrust but is repeatedly undermined by weak infrastructure, poor public communication, and limited adoption.
Crucially, the study documents widespread cryptocurrency adoption across Africa despite regulatory hostility, infrastructural gaps, and skills shortages. This adoption did not emerge from policy endorsement, sandbox protection, or institutional readiness, but instead, from practical use. It emerged from use. High transaction costs, ineffective intermediaries, and institutional distrust created conditions in which decentralized alternatives, such as Bitcoin, addressed lived economic reality.
While the paper discussed cryptocurrency broadly, Bitcoin’s specific properties—its fully decentralized architecture, fixed monetary policy, and permissionless access—position it distinctly within this landscape. Unlike CBDCs or sandbox-approved fintech products, Bitcoin operates beyond state control, exposing the limits of state-led digital projects precisely through its independence.
The implications for policymakers and researchers are significant. If state-led digital instruments consistently fail to achieve adoption while decentralized alternatives flourish despite regulatory opposition, the strategic question shifts. Rather than asking how the government can control blockchain-based finance, a more productive inquiry may be how political frameworks can accommodate already-functioning systems like Bitcoin without requiring state intervention to operate.
